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DRONES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: 
REDEFINING EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
MATTHEW R. KOERNER† 
ABSTRACT 
  Drones have gained notoriety as a weapon against foreign terrorist 
targets; yet, they have also recently made headlines as an instrument 
for domestic surveillance. With their sophisticated capabilities and 
continuously decreasing costs, it is not surprising that drones have 
attracted numerous consumers—most notably, law enforcement. 
Courts will likely soon have to decipher the limits on the 
government’s use of drones under the Fourth Amendment. But it is 
unclear where, or even whether, drones would fall under the current 
jurisprudence. Because of their diverse and sophisticated designs and 
capabilities, drones might be able to maneuver through the Fourth 
Amendment’s doctrinal loopholes. 
  This Note advocates analyzing drones under an adapted approach 
to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in Katz v. United States. 
Courts should focus more on the test’s oft-neglected first prong—
whether a person exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy—and 
analyze what information falls within the scope of that expectation, 
excluding information knowingly exposed to the plain view of the 
public. This analysis also considers instances when, although a 
subjective expectation exists, it may be impossible or implausible to 
reasonably exhibit that expectation, a dilemma especially relevant to 
an analysis of drones. 
  Courts that adopt the recommended analysis would have a 
coherent and comprehensible approach to factually dynamic cases 
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challenging the constitutionality of drone surveillance. Until then, the 
constitutional uncertainties of these cases will likely linger. 
INTRODUCTION 
Senator Dianne Feinstein, a staunch advocate of governmental 
surveillance1 and Chairman of the 113th Congress’s Senate 
Intelligence Committee,2 recently found herself, rather ironically, as 
the target of surveillance.3 One day at her home, Senator Feinstein 
walked to the window to check on a protest that was taking place 
outside.4 Much to her surprise, a small drone5 hovered on the other 
side of the window, only inches away, spying on her.6 The drone 
immediately flew away.7 
Senator Feinstein’s experience is just one example of drones 
being used for surveillance within the United States. But her story 
and others like it8 have sparked significant controversy over the use of 
drones for domestic surveillance, which falls within a broader debate 
 
 1. See Spencer Ackerman, Feinstein Promotes Bill to Strengthen NSA’s Hand on 
Warrantless Searches, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/nov/15/feinstein-bill-nsa-warrantless-searches-surveillance. 
 2. Members, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, http://www.intelligence.
senate.gov/memberscurrent.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).  
 3. Kathryn A. Wolfe, Dianne Feinstein Spots Drone Inches from Face, POLITICO (Jan. 15, 
2014, 4:15 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/senator-dianne-feinstein-encounter-with-
drone-technology-privacy-surveillance-102233.html. This is not the first time that Senator 
Feinstein has been the subject of surveillance. See Mark Mazzetti & Carl Hulse, Inquiry by 
C.I.A. Affirms It Spied on Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2014, at A1 (“An internal 
investigation by the C.I.A. has found that its officers penetrated a computer network used by 
the Senate Intelligence Committee [chaired by Feinstein and] . . . read the emails of the Senate 
[staff] . . . .”). 
 4. Wolfe, supra note 3. The crowd was supposedly protesting the National Security 
Agency’s spying program. Id. 
 5. The technology often referred to as “drones” is also called Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAV), Uninhabited Aerial Systems (UAS), Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV), and Remotely 
Operated Aircrafts (ROA). STEVEN J. ZALOGA, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: ROBOTIC 
AIR WARFARE 1917–2007, at 2 (2008). This Note uses “drone” to refer to all of these initialisms 
and, specifically, for any unmanned, electronic or mechanical instrument that flies and uses 
sensory technology to acquire information. It uses this term not because of any associated 
negative connotations but because of public familiarity with the term “drone.” 
 6. Wolfe, supra note 3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Cf. Jason Koebler, North Dakota Man Sentenced to Jail in Controversial Drone-Arrest 
Case, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/01/
15/north-dakota-man-sentenced-to-jail-in-controversial-drone-arrest-case (reporting on the first 
person to be arrested and convicted of a crime based on evidence obtained by drone 
surveillance).  
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on privacy and governmental surveillance programs.9 Advocates of 
robust federal surveillance policies champion governmental 
surveillance as the only way to prevent terrorist and cyber attacks 
against the United States.10 President Barack Obama defended these 
surveillance programs as “‘modest encroachments on privacy’” that 
“strik[e] the ‘right balance’ between national security and civil 
liberties.”11 In comparison, privacy advocates envision these 
surveillance programs leading to a dystopian, totalitarian government 
watching over its citizenry—undetected but omnipresent.12 
References to George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four13 abound.14 
 
 9. See Andy Pasztor & Jack Nicas, Drone Plan Draws Privacy Concerns, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 7, 2013, 7:58 PM, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303309504579183
711382731676 (reporting that a federal plan to integrate drones into the national airspace “riled 
critics seeking greater attention to privacy protections” at a time of “heightened public and 
congressional concern about the government’s surveillance capabilities”); see also Peter Finn & 
Ellen Nakashima, Obama Defends Sweeping Surveillance Standards, WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-defends-sweeping-surveillance-efforts/2013/06/
07/2002290a-cf88-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.html (“[President Barack] Obama said it was 
‘healthy for our democracy’ to have an open discussion about the balance between privacy and 
security concerns . . . .”).  
 10. See David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, N.S.A. Director Firmly Defends Surveillance 
Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013, at A15 (reporting that the Director of the National Security 
Agency, General Keith Alexander, defended the agency’s surveillance programs as the only 
option to prevent terrorist and cyber attacks against the United States and stated that to do so, 
the United States must expand these surveillance programs). 
 11. Justin Sink, Obama Defends NSA Surveillance Programs as ‘Right Balance’, HILL (June 
7, 2013, 6:07 PM), http://thehill.com/video/administration/304165-obama-defends-nsa-programs-
as-striking-right-balance. President Obama’s statement seems to be the antithesis of Benjamin 
Franklin’s famous warning on trading liberty for safety: “Those who would give up essential 
Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” J.A. LEO 
LEMAY, 3 THE LIFE OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: SOLDIER, SCIENTIST, AND POLITICIAN, 1748–
1757, at 474 (2009). 
 12. See Pasztor & Nicas, supra note 9 (discussing a bill introduced by U.S. Senator Ed 
Markey to establish privacy rules governing the use of drones to protect Americans from “‘spies 
in the sky,’” and the passage of drone-privacy laws in eight states during 2013). 
 13. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). Nineteen Eighty-Four has 
frequently been cited as the poster child for a dystopian, totalitarian government that constantly 
surveils its citizenry. See sources cited infra note 14. 
 14. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466–67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(discussing governmental surveillance and referencing Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell); 
M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 32 (2011) (same); 
Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’: An Emerging Tripartite 
Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1078–79 (1987) (same). In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012), the Supreme Court considered a question particularly relevant to drones and their 
ability to track individuals: whether the government may place a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) on an individual’s vehicle and track her public movements without a warrant. Id. at 948. 
During oral arguments in Jones, Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four was mentioned six times. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, 25, 27, 33, 35, 57, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259). 
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Apart from the surrounding privacy-concerns debate, drones 
currently provide many practical benefits and their projected 
applications seem limitless.15 Based on their obvious advantage of 
being unmanned, drones have the capability to conduct missions 
previously considered too risky, dangerous, or impracticable. These 
applications are also provided at continuously decreasing costs and 
with the latest technological sophistication, such as the capability to 
see through physical obstructions, to detect various chemical and 
biological agents in the air, to recognize human faces and license 
plates, and to fly in strategic, coordinated formations.16 
As has frequently been the case, however, the benefits of 
technological advancement come with the risk of abuse and 
harassment.17 These risks are greater when the technology is utilized 
by government entities.18 This Note examines the challenges that the 
United States faces in addressing those risks and harmonizing the 
conflict between government and technology. Has privacy prospered 
or foundered through the development of technology? More 
specifically, how will the burgeoning swarm of drones over American 
soil affect domestic law enforcement, and how will these effects 
withstand Fourth Amendment19 scrutiny? 
 
 15. See infra notes 143–49 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text, and Part II.B. 
 17. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (describing the Court’s role of “ensur[ing] that Fourth Amendment 
rights would retain their vitality as technology expanded the Government’s capacity to commit 
unsuspected intrusions into private areas and activities”); id. (concluding that the majority 
opinion’s approach “will not protect Fourth Amendment rights, but rather will permit their 
gradual decay as technology advances”); see, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 
276 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing GPS as “a technology surely capable of abuses fit for a dystopian 
novel”), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens 
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”).  
 18. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Government’s 
unrestrained power to assemble data . . . is susceptible to abuse.”); see also Riley v. California, 
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Many forms of modern technology are 
making it easier and easier for both government and private entities to amass a wealth of 
information about the lives of ordinary Americans . . . .”).  
 19. The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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Drones, with their current and projected capabilities, present a 
perfect storm of issues that fall outside of current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence but still appear to implicate the Fourth Amendment.20 
Drones can maneuver through each and every loophole of the 
jurisprudence for warrantless searches.21 They travel on public 
airways at low or high altitudes, undetected and with little or no 
undue noise, nuisance, or threat to persons or property.22 They can 
utilize sense-enhancing technologies that are, or will soon be, in 
general public use.23 And drones can use these technologies to gather 
an abundance of intimate details and information, previously 
impossible or impracticable to acquire.24 Law enforcement is likely to 
increasingly use drones for domestic surveillance,25 and this will likely 
propel drones to the forefront of courts’ dockets.26 
Scholars have written exhaustively on many aspects of the 
Fourth Amendment, and its intersection with drones has recently 
 
 20. See Scott Bomboy, A Legal Victory for Drones Warrants a Fourth Amendment 
Discussion, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Feb. 7, 2014), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/02/a-
court-victory-for-drones-warrants-a-fourth-amendment-discussion (“For now, there doesn’t 
seem to be a clear-cut answer [on drone surveillance under the Fourth Amendment] . . . .”). 
 21. This Note addresses exclusively warrantless surveillance by drones. It does not 
advocate a blanket prohibition of the use of drones, their technology, or even a prohibition of 
their use by law enforcement or public entities. Drones provide numerous advantages in both 
the private and public setting. Their integration and expansion into the airspace under the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA Modernization Act) is greatly needed. For law-
enforcement purposes, drones may provide the greatest advancement in decades—minimizing 
risk to police officers, expanding available information, and reducing policing expenses. 
  These positive aspects, however, do not negate the virtues of requiring warrants in 
certain situations. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (“[T]he warrant requirement is ‘an important 
working part of our machinery of government,’ not merely ‘an inconvenience to be somehow 
“weighed” against the claims of police efficiency.’” (citation omitted)). Requiring warrants for 
certain governmental intrusions protects society’s privacy expectations and the minimum 
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, this system promotes the credibility of law-
enforcement surveillance because of the ex ante review of the intrusion by a judge, requiring 
probable cause before authorizing a warrant. 
 22. See infra Part III.B. 
 23. See infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Koebler, supra note 8 (reporting on the first person to be arrested and convicted of 
a crime based on evidence obtained by drone surveillance). 
 26. Current events will also likely accelerate the use of drones. See infra text accompanying 
notes 153–58. But see Jeff Pegues, Some Drone Decisions Expected Soon, with Final Rules 
Likely Years Away, CBS NEWS (Dec. 29, 2014, 11:26 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/some-
drone-decisions-expected-soon-with-final-rules-likely-years-away (“[I]t is nearly certain that the 
FAA will not meet [the September 2015] deadline. Instead, 2017 seems to be a more realistic 
time frame.”). 
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received significant attention.27 Much of the literature on drones and 
the Fourth Amendment recognizes that it is unclear where—and 
whether—drones fall within current jurisprudence, and recommends 
a variety of legislative solutions.28 But although scholars identify the 
legal uncertainties with drones, those recommending legislative action 
endorse a partial solution that only perpetuates the problem that the 
courts have maintained with respect to technology and the Fourth 
Amendment. Specifically, just as current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has failed to keep pace with advancing technology, a 
legislative approach will also trail behind.29 This Note addresses these 
 
 27. A Westlaw search through law reviews and journals for pieces, published before 
January 1, 2015, that use the words “drones,” “search,” and “Fourth Amendment” recovered 
250 pieces. Of these, eighty-five were published in 2014; seventy-four were published in 2013; 
thirty-eight were published in 2012; twelve were published in 2011; and forty-one were 
published before 2011, the earliest in 1991. For example, see generally Timothy T. Takahashi, 
Drones and Privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 72 (2013); John Villasenor, Observations 
from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457 (2013); 
Philip J. Hiltner, Comment, The Drones Are Coming: Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for 
Police Surveillance and Its Fourth Amendment Implications, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 397 
(2013); Troy Roberts, Comment, On the Radar: Government Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and 
Their Effect on Public Privacy Interests from Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence and Legislative 
Policy Perspectives, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 491 (2009); Andrew B. Talai, Comment, Drones and 
Jones: The Fourth Amendment and Police Discretion in the Digital Age, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 729 
(2014).  
 28. See, e.g., Calo, supra note 14, at 29 (arguing that drones may be the “catalyst” to “drag 
privacy law into the twenty-first century”); Roberts, supra note 27, at 516 (arguing that the 
Fourth Amendment provides few protections against the government’s use of drones for 
surveillance and that legislative and regulatory action is necessary); Villasenor, supra note 27, at 
508 (arguing for law-enforcement policies and legislation to govern drone usage); see also 
Richard M. Thompson II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN DOMESTIC 
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE 
RESPONSES (Apr. 3, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf; Bart Elias, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R42718, PILOTLESS DRONES: BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
CONGRESS REGARDING UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE 
SYSTEM (Sept. 10, 2012), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42718.pdf; cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473, 2497–98 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a 
better position than we are to assess and respond to the [technological] changes that have 
already occurred and those that almost certainly will take place in the future.”). 
 29. A successful legislative approach to drones, or more broadly to governmental 
surveillance, is also in many ways unrealistic and unlikely based on the current political context 
and on Congress’s legislative record on Fourth Amendment–like protections. In over 225 years 
since the Bill of Rights was enacted, many of the significant restrictions on governmental 
investigations have emerged from the courts, rather than Congress. The Supreme Court has 
frequently stepped in, or perhaps was forced to step in, to uphold the minimum guarantees 
against unreasonable searches provided by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (holding that the police may not, without a warrant, 
search through digital information on an arrestee’s cell phone); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 353 (1967) (holding that the police may not, without a warrant, wiretap and listen to a 
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issues and recommends an adaptive approach to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence in the age of the drone. 
For these reasons, it is highly probable that courts will soon 
confront issues regarding the use of drones for domestic 
surveillance.30 This Note argues that when these issues arise, courts 
should apply the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test expounded in 
Katz v. United States,31 and, in doing so, expand on the subjective-
expectation-of-privacy requirement. This oft-neglected element of the 
two-pronged test provides critical analysis that is especially relevant 
to cases involving drones. In further analyzing and clarifying the 
subjective-expectation requirement, courts should proceed in three 
steps. First, they should determine whether the surveilled person 
“exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”—the 
 
person’s phone call from a public telephone booth); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) 
(holding that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search may not be admitted at trial as 
evidence). The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012), 
is one rare example of a legislative approach to Fourth Amendment issues.  
  A legislative solution is unrealistic also because of the current political context. A 
politician who attempts to support legislative action that would implement a robust protection 
against governmental surveillance by drones might be attacked as being “soft on crime.” See 
BRANDON C. WELSH & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME 
PREVENTION 491 (2012) (“It has often been observed that getting tough with [criminal] 
offenders carries political benefits.”). This political fodder would likely dissuade many 
politicians, as it has in other contexts in the past, from proposing or voting in favor of a 
legislative solution similar to those proposed by the sources above. See sources cited supra note 
28. Therefore, a legislative solution is unlikely.  
  Nonetheless, there are some jurists who have advocated for legislative solutions to 
remedy complex Fourth Amendment issues. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“In light of [technological] developments, it would be very unfortunate if privacy 
protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument 
of the Fourth Amendment.”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“It would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity to grapple with 
these emerging issues [concerning technology] rather than to shackle them with prematurely 
devised constitutional constraints.”). Although these jurists might believe that a legislative 
solution is preferable, they do not acknowledge that it is likely to occur.  
  In light of this legislative apathy, it is therefore critical to understand where the Fourth 
Amendment sets the floor of rights for individuals and what restrictions there are on 
governmental surveillance by drones.  
 30. Cf. Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at *12, North 
Dakota v. Brossart, Nos. 32-2011-CR-00049, 00071, 32-2011-CR-00074, 32-2011-CR-00050, 
00076, 32-2011-CR-00046, 32-2011-CR-00048, 32-2011-CR-00047 (N.D. Dist. Ct. July 31, 2012), 
available at https://www.nacdl.org/uploadedFiles/files/news_and_the_champion/DDIC/
Brossart%20Order.pdf (denying a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to suppress evidence 
obtained by a drone because “[t]here was no improper use of a [drone]”); Bomboy, supra note 
20 (reporting on the first case where a person was arrested and convicted of a crime based on 
evidence obtained by a drone). 
 31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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threshold issue in order for the Fourth Amendment to apply.32 
Second, if the person held a subjective expectation of privacy, courts 
should evaluate the scope of that privacy expectation. And third, they 
should determine whether the person “expose[d] [information] to the 
‘plain view’ of outsiders” and whether the evidence at issue fell within 
the scope of that exposure.33 
This Note analyzes drones under current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and suggests an adapted approach to Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to help remedy many of the problems 
presented by drones. Part I discusses Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence relevant to an analysis of drone technology. Part II 
provides an overview of the current market for drones, as well as 
their current designs and capabilities. Part III analyzes the current 
doctrinal failings of the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
when applied to drones. Finally, Part IV outlines a more effective 
analysis of drones under the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test 
by analyzing the specific facts that might express a surveilled person’s 
subjective expectation of privacy, the scope of those expressive 
factors, and whether the information obtained through surveillance 
was exposed to the plain view of the public. This reemphasized and 
expanded analysis would likely solve many of the problems presented 
by the application of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to 
drones. 
I.  DRONES AND CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he right of people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”34 The 
Fourth Amendment is the “chief source of privacy protection” in the 
American justice system.35 It is intended to empower the government 
to investigate and enforce laws to a “reasonably satisfactory level,” 
while still restricting these powers.36 In doing so, it acts as a “bulwark 
 
 32. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 33. Id. 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 35. RONALD JAY ALLEN, WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, DEBRA A. 
LIVINGSTON & ANDREW D. LEIBOLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL 337 (2011). 
 36. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 476, 484 (2011). 
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against police practices that prevail in totalitarian regimes.”37 Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has therefore sought an appropriate 
balance between the government’s investigative and prosecutorial 
powers and an individual’s constitutional rights. 
In applying the Fourth Amendment to drones, a court must 
undertake several relevant inquiries to determine if the government’s 
use of the drone violates the Fourth Amendment. The court must first 
determine whether a search for Fourth Amendment purposes 
occurred.38 If no search transpired, then the Fourth Amendment is not 
implicated.39 Second, if a search occurred for which no warrant was 
issued, the court must consider whether that search was reasonable.40 
Therefore, when analyzing the government’s use of drones for 
domestic surveillance, an issue not yet ruled on by the Supreme 
Court, the first—and, under current jurisprudence, the most 
relevant—inquiry is whether this surveillance constitutes a search. 
This fundamental question plays a significant role in existing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and any potentially successful challenge 
to domestic drone surveillance must first satisfy this inquiry. The issue 
of whether a search occurred, in addition to whether that search was 
reasonable, has perplexed courts since the Fourth Amendment’s 
ratification.41 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been heavily 
criticized by numerous legal scholars and labeled “a mess,”42 “a 
theoretical embarrassment,”43 and “a vast jumble of judicial 
pronouncements that is not merely complex and contradictory, but 
often perverse.”44 
 
 37. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 38. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, 
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 82 (1999). 
 39. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 418. 
 40. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 38, at 62, 334.  
 41. See Kerr, supra note 36, at 480 (“Fourth Amendment rules can appear to be selected 
almost at random. The patchwork of results has made search and seizure law a theoretical 
embarrassment to scholars and judges alike. According to scholars, the law lacks any theoretical 
grounding. It is cobbled together from ‘a series of inconsistent and bizarre results that [the 
Court] has left entirely undefended.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“[T]he antecedent question whether or not a Fourth 
Amendment ‘search’ has occurred is not so simple under our precedent.”). 
 42. Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of 
Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149 (1998). 
 43. Kerr, supra note 36, at 480.  
 44. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758 
(1994). 
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Through the doctrine’s “patchwork of [Fourth Amendment] 
protections,”45 two frameworks have arisen for identifying a search: a 
property-rights paradigm and a privacy-rights paradigm.46 The 
traditional property-rights paradigm focuses on common-law 
property rights and examines the government’s conduct under the 
“trespass,” “curtilage,” and “open-fields” doctrines. Beginning in the 
twentieth century, courts also adopted a paradigm that focuses on a 
person’s expectations of privacy and analyzes whether these 
expectations are both subjectively held and objectively reasonable. 
These two paradigms recognize the intertwined property and privacy 
principles inherent in the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.47 
A. The Property-Rights Paradigm 
The property-rights framework uses common-law property rights 
as the parameters for identifying a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. This approach arose from historical roots in the 
common law and society’s reverence for individual property rights.48 
This paradigm also reflects a simple and transparent doctrinal 
solution to unreasonable governmental intrusions limited by pre-
twentieth century investigatory mechanisms that relied on the natural 
senses.49 Such searches typically required a physical trespass to 
acquire the information sought by the government.50 
United States v. Jones51 provides a modern example of the 
property-rights paradigm under the trespass doctrine. In Jones, the 
Supreme Court considered whether attaching a Global Positioning 
 
 45. Kerr, supra note 36, at 479. 
 46. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (“[T]he Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory 
test.”). 
 47. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (describing 
the connection between property and privacy within the Fourth Amendment).  
 48. Entick v. Carrington, [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. (K.B.) [817] (“Our law holds the property of 
every man so sacred that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave. If 
he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all.”). Courts and legal scholars have 
long considered Carrington as “‘the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law’ with 
regard to search and seizure” and “‘undoubtedly familiar’ to ‘every American statesman’ at the 
time the Constitution was adopted.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 
489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)). 
 49. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (“One virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-
rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”).  
 50. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. 
 51. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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System (GPS) to Antoine Jones’s vehicle and monitoring his 
movements on public roads for twenty-eight days without a warrant 
constituted an unreasonable search.52 The Court unanimously found 
that the government’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, but 
the justices split over their reasoning for that holding.53 The majority 
opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that the government’s 
actions violated Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights based upon the 
trespass doctrine.54 By physically attaching a GPS to Jones’s vehicle, 
the government committed a trespass upon chattel and “encroached 
on a [constitutionally] protected area,” notwithstanding the 
government’s monitoring of the vehicle’s movements on public 
roads.55 The government’s actions therefore constituted an 
unreasonable search.56 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has extended this property-
rights paradigm to the curtilage doctrine. The curtilage of the home is 
considered as “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment 
purposes” and, thus, afforded the same protections.57 The curtilage 
consists of the area immediately surrounding a home where the 
private details of the home naturally extend,58 and it is “intimately 
linked to the home, both physically and psychologically.”59 In 
determining whether an area forms the curtilage, courts have 
considered a variety of factors, including “the proximity of the 
area . . . to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure 
surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, 
 
 52. Id. at 948. 
 53. Id. at 947. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor joined 
Justice Scalia’s opinion holding that the government’s conduct constituted a search under the 
property-rights paradigm. Id. at 947, 949. Justice Sotomayor entered a concurring opinion 
arguing that the government’s conduct constituted a search under both the property- and 
privacy-rights paradigms. Id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). And Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Alito’s concurring opinion arguing that the government’s 
conduct constituted a search under the privacy-rights paradigm. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 54. Id. at 949. 
 55. Id. at 952. 
 56. Id. at 949. 
 57. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). 
 58. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15 (2013) (finding that the front 
porch of a home fell within the curtilage); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) 
(finding that a “fenced-in backyard” fell within the curtilage). But see Dow Chem. Co. v. United 
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (finding that “the open areas of an industrial plant complex . . . 
spread over an area of 2,000 acres” did not fall within the curtilage). 
 59. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. 
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and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from 
observation by people passing by.”60 The curtilage is generally easily 
identifiable and understandable from our common experiences and 
knowledge.61 The Supreme Court has found the curtilage to include, 
among other areas, a front porch to a home62 and a “fenced-in 
backyard.”63 The curtilage does not include, however, “the open areas 
of an industrial plant complex . . . spread over an area of 2,000 
acres.”64 
In Florida v. Jardines,65 a 2013 property-rights case, the Supreme 
Court discussed the Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed to 
the curtilage as well as the scope of an implicit license to enter the 
curtilage for certain purposes. Here, the Court considered whether 
the government’s brief physical presence on Joelis Jardines’s front 
porch with a drug-sniffing dog, to investigate if illicit drugs were 
inside the home, constituted an unreasonable search.66 The majority 
held that by entering the curtilage (here, the front porch) and acting 
beyond an implicit license to approach a home and solicit its 
occupants (here, using the drug-sniffing dog), the government 
physically trespassed on a constitutionally protected area and, thus, 
violated Jardines’s Fourth Amendment rights.67 According to the 
Court, the type of investigative instrument utilized,68 the duration of 
the trespass,69 and the fact that any law-enforcement officer or citizen 
could enter the same area to knock on the door and attempt to 
contact the home’s occupants,70 were all irrelevant. 
By contrast, courts have not extended the same guarantees 
afforded to the home and its curtilage to areas deemed analogous to 
an open field.71 Open fields are not required to be either open or 
fields in the literal sense, but they typically fall outside of the home’s 
 
 60. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
 61. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12. 
 62. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
 63. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. 
 64. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). 
 65. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 66. Id. at 1413.  
 67. Id. at 1417–18. 
 68. Id. at 1417. 
 69. See id. at 1421 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for ignoring the 
short period of time, approximately one or two minutes, during which the events transpired). 
 70. Id. at 1416 (majority opinion). 
 71. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235–36 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984). 
KOERNER IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2015  11:35 PM 
2015] DRONES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1141 
curtilage.72 Accordingly, an absence or insufficiency of the 
enumerated factors establishing the curtilage of a home would denote 
an open field.73 The Court has found, for example, that a barn was 
located in an open field, rather than the curtilage, because the barn 
was fifty yards from a fence surrounding the home and sixty yards 
from the home, the barn was not surrounded by a fence, the barn 
“was not being used for intimate activities of the home,” and the 
resident of the home “did little to protect the barn area from 
observation by those standing in open fields.”74 Open fields do not 
share the same setting for private activities and information that the 
Fourth Amendment protects from governmental intrusions.75 Thus, a 
person may not expect privacy in an open field, and the government’s 
conduct generally would not constitute a search.76 
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,77 the Supreme Court 
considered whether the curtilage or open-fields doctrine applied to 
the open areas between buildings on a large industrial property.78 The 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted 
warrantless, aerial surveillance of a two-thousand-acre facility owned 
by Dow Chemical.79 Finding that the extensive, scattered outdoor 
areas of the complex were neither precisely the curtilage nor an open 
field,80 the Court concluded that the complex was more similar to an 
open field.81 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees did not 
extend to these areas, and the government’s actions did not constitute 
a search.82 
The Supreme Court has recently adapted this property-rights 
paradigm to investigations of the home that would traditionally fall 
 
 72. Dow, 476 U.S. at 236, 239 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987).  
 73. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (listing the 
factors relevant to determining whether an area constitutes the curtilage); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 
171 (“[T]he common law, by implying that only the land immediately surrounding and 
associated with the home warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home, 
conversely implies that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.”). 
 74. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302–03. 
 75. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.  
 76. Id. at 178. 
 77. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
 78. Id. at 235. 
 79. Id. at 229. 
 80. Id. at 236. 
 81. Id. at 239. 
 82. Id. 
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outside the trespass doctrine because they do not complete a 
traditional, physical trespass. This adaptation, expounded in Kyllo v. 
United States,83 has extended the property-rights paradigm to certain 
invasive technologies in order to shelter the Fourth Amendment’s 
guarantees from modern technology.84 This paradigm will likely play a 
critical role in evaluating the constitutionality of many sophisticated 
technologies employed by drones. In Kyllo, a federal agent, 
investigating whether Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana plants 
using heat lamps inside his home, used a thermal-imaging device from 
a public roadway to determine if there was an elevated amount of 
heat emanating from the walls of the home.85 The Supreme Court 
considered whether the government’s use of the thermal imager 
constituted an unreasonable search and, more generally, “what limits 
there are upon [the] power of technology to shrink the realm of 
guaranteed privacy.”86 The majority held that when the government 
uses sense-enhancing technology to acquire details from within “the 
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’” then this conduct 
constitutes an unreasonable search when the technology “is not in 
general public use.”87 
Although the Court failed to clarify the parameters of general 
public use, several earlier cases introducing this requirement seemed 
to require only marginal use or prevalence.88 For example, in Florida 
v. Riley,89 the Supreme Court found that helicopter travel was not 
“unheard of” in the area and that it was not “sufficiently rare” to 
raise a Fourth Amendment issue.90 In Dow, the Court found a twenty-
two-thousand-dollar mapmaking camera to be “conventional.”91 The 
scope of this general-use element is especially relevant to the 
impending boom in drone usage and the forthcoming Federal 
 
 83. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 84. Id. at 34 (stating that the rule in Kyllo “assures preservation of that degree of privacy 
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted”); id. at 36 (“[T]he 
rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development.”). 
 85. Id. at 29. 
 86. Id. at 34. 
 87. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
 88. The Court did note, however, that the thermal imager was “relatively crude” and not in 
general public use. Id. at 34, 36.  
 89. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 90. Id. at 450–51.  
 91. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). 
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Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations under the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA Modernization Act),92 
which will integrate drones into the national airspace.93 
B. The Privacy-Rights Paradigm 
Beginning in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court adopted 
a new Fourth Amendment doctrine analyzing certain nontrespassory 
issues under privacy-rights rationales. In recognizing that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places,” the Court attempted to 
guide the doctrine’s analytical criterion to maintain the Fourth 
Amendment’s guarantees in the face of modern technology.94 This 
privacy-rights approach resulted from the Court’s recognition of 
various technological advancements that no longer fell neatly within 
the property-rights jurisprudence.95 These new technologies have 
enabled the government to acquire the same type of information—as 
well as entirely new types of information—that traditionally could 
only have been lawfully collected by the government pursuant to a 
warrant.96 
The Court first announced the privacy-rights paradigm in Katz v. 
United States. In Katz, the government attached a microphone to a 
public phone booth to listen to and record Charles Katz’s telephone 
conversations.97 The Court rejected the argument that a Fourth 
Amendment violation turned on whether a physical trespass had 
occurred.98 Instead, it held that the government had violated Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy by listening to his conversation, 
 
 92. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. 
11, 73 (2012). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 95. See id. at 353 (holding that the government’s conduct violated Katz’s privacy rights 
under the Fourth Amendment and reasoning that “[t]he fact that the electronic device . . . did 
not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance”). 
 96. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 132 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“Indeed, a cell phone search 
would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: 
A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; 
it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form . . . .”); 
id. at 2494–95 (“Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all 
they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” 
(citation omitted)); id. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Many cell phones now in use are capable 
of storing and accessing a quantity of information, some highly personal, that no person would 
ever have had on his person in hard-copy form.”).  
 97. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
 98. Id. at 353. 
KOERNER IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2015  11:35 PM 
1144 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1129 
which was intended to be private once he closed the phone-booth 
door.99 The government’s actions therefore constituted an 
unreasonable search.100 In so holding, the Court reasoned that “[w]hat 
a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”101 
Although the majority opinion diverged from the traditional 
inquiry regarding property rights as the sole relevant criterion in 
identifying a Fourth Amendment search,102 Katz’s prominence in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence comes from Justice John Harlan’s 
concurring opinion.103 Justice Harlan interpreted the majority opinion 
as holding, in part, that “electronic as well as physical intrusion” into 
areas where “a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy” can violate the Fourth Amendment, and that 
“the invasion of a constitutionally protected area by [the government] 
is . . . presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search 
warrant.”104 In finding an invasion of Katz’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, Justice Harlan established a two-part test for determining 
whether such an expectation existed.105 First, a person must “have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.”106 Second, 
that subjective expectation must “be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as [objectively] ‘reasonable.’”107 
In the decades following Katz and the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test, the Court confronted the issue of warrantless, aerial 
surveillance in three key cases.108 Although each of the cases 
considered aerial surveillance in some respect, they all added a 
different dynamic to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the 
 
 99. Id. at 352. 
 100. Id. at 353. 
 101. Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted). 
 102. Id. at 353. 
 103. The Court subsequently adopted the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
 104. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 361. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
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reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. And each case informs the 
approach to drones. 
California v. Ciraolo,109 the first of the aerial-surveillance triad, 
addressed the constitutionality of warrantless, “naked-eye 
observation” of the curtilage of a home from above.110 To investigate 
an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his 
backyard, police officers flew an airplane over his property, 
photographing marijuana plants discovered on the property from 
one-thousand feet above.111 The Court held that although Ciraolo 
“manifest[ed] his own subjective intent and desire to maintain 
privacy” by putting up a fence,112 his expectation was not one that 
society was prepared to recognize as reasonable.113 The majority 
reasoned that because of the proliferation of air travel, anyone could 
look down and observe the curtilage of Ciraolo’s home with naked-
eye observation.114 The Fourth Amendment does not hold the police 
to a higher standard and require them “to shield their eyes when 
passing by a home on public thoroughfares . . . where [they have] a 
right to be.”115 
Dow, discussed above, also considered the “narrow issue” of 
whether nontrespassory, aerial surveillance of a large commercial 
property constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.116 In Dow, the 
EPA surveilled a two-thousand-acre commercial complex from 
altitudes of twelve-hundred feet and above.117 The aircraft used “a 
conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in 
mapmaking”118 that cost over twenty-two-thousand dollars in the 
1980s and was able to enlarge photographs taken at twelve-hundred 
feet to identify something as small as a power line about one-half of 
an inch in diameter.119 Although the majority opinion focused most of 
 
 109. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 110. Id. at 213. 
 111. Id. at 209. 
 112. Id. at 211. Although it referenced Ciraolo’s subjective expectation of privacy, the Court 
neglected to determine the subjective requirement because the state had waived this issue on 
appeal. Id.  
 113. Id. at 214. 
 114. Id. at 215. 
 115. Id. at 213. 
 116. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 (1986). 
 117. Id. at 229. 
 118. Id. at 238. 
 119. Id. at 242 n.4, 243 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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its analysis on the open-fields doctrine120 and the facts of Ciraolo, 
which had been decided on the same day as Dow,121 it also cited the 
reduced expectations of privacy in commercial properties and the 
type of technology utilized by the government as relevant to its 
inquiry.122 The Court reasoned that because expectations of privacy in 
commercial properties are lesser than those in a home, the Fourth 
Amendment does not extend to commercial properties as it does to 
the home.123 The majority opinion also suggested that the use of 
“highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available 
to the public” might constitute an unreasonable search.124 The 
technology used by the EPA, however, was not so sophisticated and 
revealing as to constitute an unreasonable search.125 
The third and final case, Florida v. Riley,126 was decided three 
years after Ciraolo and Dow and garnered only a plurality vote of the 
Court.127 In Florida v. Riley, the Supreme Court considered whether 
warrantless, naked-eye aerial observation of the interior of a partially 
enclosed greenhouse violated the Fourth Amendment.128 Police 
officers, investigating an anonymous tip, flew a helicopter four-
hundred feet over Riley’s greenhouse, which was located ten to 
twenty feet from his home.129 Because sections of the greenhouse roof 
were missing, the officers were able to see inside the greenhouse and 
identify marijuana plants through naked-eye observation.130 
Although finding that the greenhouse was within the curtilage, 
the Court held that the government’s conduct did not constitute a 
search for Fourth Amendment purposes.131 The plurality opinion 
reasoned that because the interior of the greenhouse was visible from 
above through the missing roof panels, Riley could not reasonably 
expect this area to be free from lawful observations from the public 
 
 120. Id. at 234–39 (majority opinion). 
 121. Both cases were decided on May 19, 1986, and Chief Justice Warren Burger authored 
both majority opinions. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986); Dow, 476 U.S. at 227. 
 122. Dow, 476 U.S. at 237–39. 
 123. Id. at 237–38 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981)). 
 124. Id. at 238. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion).  
 127. Id. at 445–47. 
 128. Id. at 447–48. 
 129. Id. at 448.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 450, 452. 
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airspace.132 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the government’s 
actions did not violate any laws or regulations and that there was no 
indication that similar helicopter flights were sufficiently rare in the 
United States to support a reasonable expectation of privacy from 
this type of observation.133 
II.  THE CURRENT STATE OF DRONE TECHNOLOGY 
Although drones have received more public attention recently, 
they have already played a significant role in both U.S. and world 
history. Recent events—and federal legislation—indicate that this 
trend is likely to continue. The current market for drones is at an all-
time high, and public and private demand for drones continues to 
grow.134 Continuing development of sophisticated drone technology, 
in addition to decreasing costs, will further increase this demand.135 
A. The Current Market for Drone Technology 
Earlier prototypes of drones were much different than those in 
the news today, and the use of drones has expanded since their 
creation.136 A predecessor to the drone first appeared in American 
military history during the American Civil War, when both Union 
and Rebel forces deployed balloons filled with explosive devices 
against each other.137 During World War I, the U.S. Navy tested and 
developed “aerial torpedoes,” a form of remote-controlled, explosive 
drones that would be flown into targets, including “German U-boats, 
their bases, and munitions factories[,] from distances of up to 100 
miles.”138 Although these aerial torpedoes were not sufficiently 
accurate to be used during World War I,139 they were eventually flown 
in World War II.140 And during the Vietnam War, the U.S. military 
used drones for surveillance, intelligence gathering, “leaflet 
 
 132. Id. at 450. 
 133. Id. at 451–52. 
 134. See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 135. See infra Part II.B; notes 150–53 and accompanying text. 
 136. See generally LAURENCE R. NEWCOME, UNMANNED AVIATION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (2004); ZALOGA, supra note 5.  
 137. Jim Garamone, From U.S. Civil War to Afghanistan: A Short History of UAVs, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Apr. 16, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44164. 
These exploding balloons were supposedly not “terribly effective.” Id. 
 138. NEWCOME, supra note 136, at 18.  
 139. ZALOGA, supra note 5, at 6.  
 140. Garamone, supra note 137. 
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dropping,” and “radar detection, location[,] and identification” of 
surface-to-air missiles.141 Drones are now frequently used to surveil 
and to conduct air strikes on terrorists and terrorist organizations.142 
Today, drones have evolved from their militaristic roots and are 
used for a variety of purposes.143 As of 2014, drones have been used to 
monitor weather patterns,144 to assist in farming and ranching,145 to 
patrol international borders,146 to map and photograph remote 
locations,147 to conduct search and rescue missions after the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti, and to survey damage after the 2011 Fukushima 
nuclear disaster.148 And the predicted applications for drones seem 
limitless. Some drone advocates have projected their use for 
engineering, firefighting, journalism, preventing animal poaching, and 
even delivering packages and pizza.149 
In addition to their sophisticated capabilities and expanding 
applications, the ever-decreasing cost of drones is further propelling 
their popularity. Although some drones like the Air Force’s RQ-
4A/B Global Hawk cost as much as $222.7 million,150 companies are 
developing far-less-expensive models—like Apple’s Parrot AR.Drone 
2.0—that cost as little as a few hundred dollars.151 In the law-
enforcement setting, the retail price for a police helicopter commonly 
used for ground support or search-and-rescue missions (not including 
expenses for fuel, maintenance, and manpower) generally exceeds 
 
 141. Id.  
 142. See, e.g., ZALOGA, supra note 5, at 4 (describing a Central Intelligence Agency drone 
attack on a senior Al Qaeda leader). 
 143. Daisy Carrington & Jenny Soffel, 15 Ways Drones Will Change Your Life, CNN (Nov. 
18, 2013, 5:23 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/03/business/meet-your-friendly-
neighborhood-drones.  
 144. Jason Koebler, NASA to Use Second Drone to Monitor Hurricanes, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (May 30, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/05/30/nasa-to-use-
second-drone-to-monitor-hurricanes. 
 145. Carrington & Soffel, supra note 143. 
 146. William Booth, More Predator Drones Fly U.S.-Mexico Border, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/more-predator-drones-fly-us-mexico-border/2011/
12/01/gIQANSZz8O_story.html. 
 147. Jason Koebler, Drones Could be Coming to American Skies Sooner Than You Think, 
POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/drones-faa-
lawsuit-coming-to-american-skies-102754.html#.UvbYJXk2_wI. 
 148. Jonathan Beale, Drones: A Rare Glimpse at Sophisticated US Spy Plane, BBC NEWS 
(Oct. 30, 2013, 8:37 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24729998. 
 149. Koebler, supra note 147.  
 150. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-294SP, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: 
ASSESSMENTS OF SELECTED WEAPON PROGRAMS 113 (2013). 
 151. Thompson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 28, at 16.  
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one-million dollars.152 These high costs have prevented many law-
enforcement departments from purchasing helicopters.153 Drones 
provide an inexpensive alternative with many of the same—and often 
greater—capabilities. 
In light of these diverse applications, American venture 
capitalists invested over forty-million dollars in drones during the first 
nine months of 2013, over twice the total amount in all of 2012,154 and 
the total global market for drones was estimated to have hit eighty-
nine billion dollars by 2013.155 Although FAA regulations have 
somewhat hindered the proliferation of drone usage,156 this bulwark 
will soon be removed by pending FAA regulations that will govern 
federal aviation law. The FAA Modernization Act directs the FAA to 
develop a plan to safely integrate drones into the national airspace no 
later than September 30, 2015.157 The inevitable result of these 
measures will be a rapid and heavy influx of drone usage in the 
United States.158 In fact, the FAA has forecast that nonmilitary 
persons will operate approximately fifteen-thousand drones by 2020 
and thirty-thousand drones by 2030.159 
These advanced and affordable technologies have attracted 
many public entities at both the federal and local level. As of 
November 2013, the FAA had granted 1387 licenses to fly drones, 
only one of which was issued to a private entity.160 The U.S. Customs 
 
 152. Peter Finn, Privacy Issues Hover Over Police Drone Use, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/privacy-issues-hover-over-police-drone-use/2011/
01/22/ABEw0uD_story.html. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Olga Kharif, As Drones Evolve from Military to Civilian Uses, Venture Capitalists Move 
In, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/as-drones-evolve-from-
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d89d714ca4dd_story.html. 
 155. Carrington & Soffel, supra note 143. 
 156. Kharif, supra note 154. 
 157. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. 
11, 73 (2012). But see Pegues, supra note 26 (“[I]t is nearly certain that the FAA will not meet 
[the September 2015] deadline. Instead, 2017 seems to be a more realistic time frame.”). 
 158. See Koebler, supra note 147 (describing the legal limitations on companies selling 
drones in the United States, and American companies who resort to selling drones abroad in 
response).  
 159. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 
2010-2030, at 48 (2010), available at http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/2010-2030/media/2010%20Forecast%20Doc.pdf. 
 160. Koebler, supra note 147. The sole private entity was the oil company ConocoPhillips. 
Id. The FAA has also granted six aerial-photography and video-production companies 
regulatory exemptions, allowing them to fly drones without a license. Press Release, Fed. 
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and Border Protection (CBP) has flown drones along the U.S.–
Mexico border since 2004 to assist its agents.161 Drones have made 
their way into the ranks of local law enforcement as well. Several 
noteworthy law-enforcement departments that have used drone 
technology include the Houston Police Department, the Miami-Dade 
Police Department, the Seattle Police Department, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations.162 According to law-enforcement officials, 
drones are a “tactical game-changer,” and “‘[n]ot since the Taser has 
a technology promised so much for law enforcement.’”163 One law-
enforcement agency, the Georgia Tech Police Department (GTPD), 
even applied for FAA authorization to fly drones for “special events” 
and “day-to-day law enforcement operations.”164 Although GTPD’s 
application was ultimately denied, the department planned to deploy 
drones to the locations of reported situations and emergencies, and 
the project was “intended . . . [to] provide valuable lessons learned for 
the use of [drones] for law enforcement nationwide.”165 
B. Current Drone Capabilities 
Most of the successes of drones are attributable to their 
sophisticated technologies and capabilities. Drones are equipped with 
various technologies for visual surveillance, audio enhancement, and 
sense-enhancing capabilities, and with sophisticated programming. 
Drones are manufactured in a variety of sizes, weights, and designs, 
and with various methods of flight and propulsion. Current models 
range in size from a wingspan of just three centimeters166 to over forty 
meters.167 Drones range in weight from eighty milligrams168 to nearly 
 
Aviation Admin., U.S. Transportation Secretary Foxx Announces FAA Exemptions for 
Commercial UAS Movie and TV Production (Sept. 25, 2014). 
 161. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Support Border Security, CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. 
TODAY (U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Washington, D.C.), July–Aug. 2004, available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2004/Aug/other/aerial_vehicles.xml. 
 162. 2011–2012 FAA List of Drone License Applicants, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/document/2012-faa-list-drone-applicants (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).  
 163. Finn, supra note 152. 
 164. Georgia Tech Police Department Drone Records, Certificate of Authorization, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/document/georgia-tech-police-dept (last visited Feb. 8, 
2015).  
 165. Id. 
 166. Amina Khan, Meet RoboBee, a Bug-sized, Bio-inspired Flying Robot, L.A. TIMES (May 
2, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/02/science/la-sci-sn-flying-robot-robobee-
smallest-ever-20130502. 
 167. Global Hawk, NORTHROP GRUMMAN, http://www.northropgrumman.com/capabilities/ 
globalhawk/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
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seven tons.169 Although many drones have been designed as 
traditional fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, there have been significant 
developments to the aeronautical design and propulsion of drones 
enabling them to fly by “flap[ping their] wings,” similar to birds and 
insects.170 
The SolarEagle and the RoboBee are perhaps two of the best 
examples that demonstrate the spectrum of advanced drone designs 
that could be used by law enforcement. The SolarEagle, currently in 
development by Boeing and the U.S. Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), is projected to have a wingspan of 
approximately 120 meters and will utilize solar energy as its power 
source.171 In comparison, the RoboBee has a wingspan of 
approximately three centimeters, weighs eighty milligrams, and was 
inspired by the bee, contributing to its design and propulsion by two 
insect-like wings that flap 120 times per second.172 Drones also have 
reached significant milestones with regard to velocity, altitude, and 
flight time. Current models are capable of reaching speeds of over 310 
knots true airspeed and altitudes of over 60,000 feet.173 The 
SolarEagle’s use of solar energy is projected to enable it to remain in 
continuous flight, without recharging or refueling, for over five 
years.174 
Drones also employ the most advanced technology available for 
visual surveillance. One such example is DARPA’s Autonomous 
Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging System 
(ARGUS).175 Alleged to be the most sophisticated surveillance 
technology ever created—and still partially classified—ARGUS can 
record video footage with 1.8-gigapixel resolution of an area covering 
fifteen square miles from a drone flying at twenty-thousand feet.176 
The recording automatically tracks all moving objects within the area 
 
 168. Khan, supra note 166. 
 169. Global Hawk, supra note 167. 
 170. Khan, supra note 166.  
 171. Boeing Wins DARPA Vulture II Program, BOEING (Sept. 16, 2010), 
http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=20295&item=1425. 
 172. Khan, supra note 166. 
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 174. Boeing Wins DARPA Vulture II Program, supra note 171. 
 175. Craig Lloyd, DARPA Unveils 1.8-Gigapixel Drone Camera, Can Target Hostiles at 
20,000 Feet, SLASHGEAR (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.slashgear.com/darpa-unveils-1-8-gigapixel-
drone-camera-can-target-hostiles-at-20000-feet-29267138. 
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and can magnify objects on the ground as small as six inches.177 
ARGUS can monitor a medium-sized city and record over five-
thousand hours of footage per day.178 Existing drone technology can 
also recognize and record license plates179 and faces.180 Other forms of 
visual-surveillance technology include the ability to see through 
obstructions such as clouds, fog, and walls; to identify objects at 
night;181 and, possibly, to recognize psychological signals that detect 
impending violent behaviors.182 
Drones are able to employ different types of sense-enhancing 
technology, including audio recorders and “sniffers” that detect 
biological, chemical, radioactive, and explosive agents in the air.183 For 
example, Makel Engineering, Inc. and Pennsylvania State University 
are currently developing a drone for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast 
Guard that weighs less than one pound and that could be deployed to 
suspicious vessels to sniff for explosives, chemical and biological 
weapons, and illicit drugs.184 
Future drone technology may be even less restricted by the need 
for human pilots at the controls. Drones can already fly 
autonomously, or without any human control.185 Some have expanded 
on this technology by programming drones to fly in coordinated, 
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 179. Cf. Eric Roper, City Cameras Track Anyone, Even Minneapolis Mayor Rybak, STAR 
TRIB. (Aug. 17, 2012, 1:13 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/166494646.html 
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ISSUES, at 6 (2013), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/Clinics/Technology/
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ychological_Signals_(DCAPS).aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
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CBRNE DETECTION MISSIONS, at 1, available at http://files.meetup.com/1275333/
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strategic formations with other drones.186 These coordinated drones 
can fly in organized columns and rows, in intersecting figure-eight 
patterns, and through physical obstructions such as windows and 
doors, along both horizontal and vertical axes.187 
A critical feature of these designs and capabilities is that these 
drones may be undetectable to the person or persons observed. 
Whether it is from thousands of feet away using precise, sense-
enhancing technology or mere inches away in an insect-like form, 
these drones have the capability to conduct surveillance without 
detection. 
Although these current features and prototypes provide 
tangible—and intriguing—examples of drone technology, they are 
intended to serve solely as models to analyze under the Fourth 
Amendment. Importantly, these are only the current designs and 
capabilities of drones, and these models will likely be outdated, 
possibly even irrelevant, by the time the courts address drone 
surveillance under the Fourth Amendment. 
III.  THE DOCTRINAL FAILINGS OF CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN APPLIED TO DRONES 
There are several problems with applying current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to drones. The factual dynamics of Fourth 
Amendment cases contribute to the mishmash of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, and the increased complexity of drone technology will 
only contribute to the problems with applying either Fourth 
Amendment search paradigm to drones. First, drones could generally 
avoid all Fourth Amendment violations under the property-rights 
paradigm because they can fly on public thoroughfares, thereby 
avoiding a trespass. Second, although the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test would provide the most workable test for an analysis of 
drones, a person would often be unable to satisfy the test’s subjective 
element, and courts have not yet expounded an understandable 
theory for the objective element. Drones therefore face considerable 
challenges under the current jurisprudence. 
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 187. Id. 
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A. Factual Dynamics of Fourth Amendment Cases 
Given its highly context-specific application, a significant feature 
of the Fourth Amendment is the dynamic factual scenarios that are 
presented for court review.188 The government often employs new 
instruments to investigate and prosecute criminals.189 Likewise, 
criminals often employ new instruments to commit crimes and to 
evade police detection or capture.190 Ordinary citizens, however, may 
employ many of these same instruments to accommodate their 
everyday conveniences and necessities. According to Professor Orin 
Kerr, this complex dynamic has contributed to the numerous 
exceptions and seemingly divergent holdings of Fourth Amendment 
precedent.191 This dynamic is exacerbated by the diverse designs and 
capabilities of sophisticated technology—a dynamic that is not 
alleviated by drone technology. 
Law enforcement can strategically use drone technology to avoid 
current Fourth Amendment prohibitions. The government can 
navigate the various doctrinal loopholes by altering the designs and 
capabilities of drones, the location and flight paths of drones, the 
means of acquiring information, and the types of information 
acquired. In effect, drones implicate the most factually diverse aspects 
of an already diverse and unpredictable jurisprudence. Analyzing 
drones under both the property-rights and privacy-rights paradigms 
thus presents significant problems for determining when the use of 
drones constitutes an unreasonable search. 
B. Property-Rights Analysis of Drones 
Although some narrow instances might raise a Fourth 
Amendment issue, drones generally would not be hampered under 
the property-rights paradigm. It is long established that an aircraft 
traveling over an individual’s land does not constitute a trespass.192 
The Supreme Court rejected the common-law concept of cuius est 
solum, eius est usque ad coelum—extending a property owner’s rights 
 
 188. Kerr, supra note 36, at 485. 
 189. Id. at 486. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See id. at 487–90 (arguing that judges recognize the factual dynamics and power 
imbalances resulting from these technologies and attempt to reconcile these dynamics by 
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Kerr calls the “Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory”). 
 192. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946). 
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to the center of the earth and the infinite limits of the universe—as a 
doctrine with “no place in the modern world.”193 In discarding this 
doctrine, the Court recognized that the “immediate reaches” around 
property still belong to the owner.194 These “immediate reaches,” 
however, seem to comprise the literal interpretation of the phrase, as 
the Supreme Court has concluded that even low-flying aircraft do not 
enter these reaches. In Florida v. Riley, for example, the plurality 
opinion held that a helicopter flying four-hundred feet over Riley’s 
property did not constitute a trespass in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.195 The plurality opinion did acknowledge, however, that 
these limits still exist and that not every aerial inspection of a home 
would survive an inquiry under the Fourth Amendment “simply 
because the [aircraft] is within the navigable airspace specified by 
law.”196 
Much of the current use of drones would not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment violation under the trespass doctrine. Drones are 
analogous to manned aircraft in many respects because they can fly 
on the same public thoroughfares abutting private property. The 
same precedent regarding air travel would therefore control. If that 
were the case, drones’ flight paths—at or above the four-hundred feet 
in Florida v. Riley—would not constitute a trespass for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. As discussed above, drones have the ability to 
fly a few inches off the ground and at altitudes of up to sixty-five-
thousand feet.197 Drones flying at lower altitudes could risk a Fourth 
Amendment violation under the trespass doctrine for being within 
the immediate reaches of the property. Assuming that they do not fly 
within these immediate reaches at ground-level altitudes or near 
taller buildings (for example, outside the window of a high-rise 
apartment), however, drones would evade trespass violations as other 
aircraft do. If the government wanted to conduct surveillance, it could 
also utilize conventional and future methods of surveillance from 
public areas or from lower levels that would not implicate the trespass 
doctrine. 
The curtilage doctrine also does not provide a significant Fourth 
Amendment impediment to law enforcement’s use of drones. If 
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 196. Id.  
 197. See supra text accompanying note 173. 
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drones fly outside the immediate reaches of property, then they are 
likely to avoid a trespass within the curtilage. Furthermore, observing 
details within the curtilage of the home from a lawful location would 
not constitute an unreasonable search, as government actors are not 
required “to shield their eyes” from observing the home or its 
curtilage.198 A Jardines-like scenario might be the exception, but it sets 
some precedent for the proposition that certain uses of drones to 
observe the inside of a home constitute a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. If the government entered the curtilage 
with a drone to obtain information, similar to Jardines,199 then the 
trespass doctrine would prohibit conduct outside of an express or 
implied license to enter the curtilage. It is highly improbable, 
however, that drones would have an express or implied license to 
enter the curtilage to investigate. 
Lastly, the open-fields doctrine provides no greater protection 
from drones. The Supreme Court has already rejected the idea that 
the Fourth Amendment applies to open fields.200 Therefore, the 
government’s use of a drone to obtain information in open fields 
would not constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Despite the advanced capabilities and high costs of some drone 
models, many would fall outside of the Fourth Amendment analysis 
stated in Kyllo v. United States. Most drone usage would not 
constitute a search under Kyllo unless the information is from the 
interior of the home—Kyllo did not consider drone surveillance of the 
home’s non-interior areas. This drone surveillance would collect 
information existing outside the home. Therefore, because this 
information does not exist within the “interior of the home” and 
presumably would not “otherwise have [required] a physical 
‘intrusion, into a constitutionally protected area,’”201 Kyllo would not 
apply to these types of drone surveillance. Kyllo would apply, 
however, to scenarios where a drone uses sense-enhancing technology 
to obtain information from within the home. In these circumstances, 
the use of the drone, similar to the thermal imager in Kyllo,202 would 
 
 198. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
 199. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013) (holding that the presence of a 
police officer and drug-sniffing dog within the curtilage to investigate for illicit drugs constituted 
an unreasonable search). 
 200. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235–36 (1986). 
 201. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).  
 202. See id. at 29–31 (describing the thermal imager used on Kyllo’s home). 
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constitute an unreasonable search by using sophisticated technology 
not in general public use to obtain information from the home that 
would have typically required a physical intrusion. For example, using 
X-ray or infrared technology that is not in general public use to locate 
persons within a home would violate the Kyllo rule and constitute an 
unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Nonetheless, a dilemma arises when the information is obtained 
by using an instrument to enhance details available from public areas. 
For example, consider whether the use of vision-enhancement 
technology to peer through an open window of a home on a secluded, 
one-hundred-acre property would fall under Kyllo. Here, the 
information is available from outside the home, but its availability by 
naked-eye observation is restricted by the vast size of the private 
property.203 Acquiring the information is possible, however, from 
lawful areas (for example, a distant public road) with the vision-
enhancement technology. Because the sense-enhancing instrument is 
necessary to acquire information from within the home and because a 
physical trespass on the property or inside the home would be 
necessary without the instrument, a court would confront conduct 
falling somewhere between the Kyllo and Ciraolo scenarios. 
Furthermore, the Court has not clarified when technology is 
sufficiently within general public use to avoid a Fourth Amendment 
violation. The Court’s earlier plurality opinion in Florida v. Riley that 
helicopter travel was not sufficiently rare to raise a Fourth 
Amendment violation204 indicated that only a marginal level of 
prevalence might be necessary (given that not many people enjoy the 
luxuries of helicopter travel). In light of Florida v. Riley and Kyllo, 
drones would not yet be in general public use because of the FAA 
regulations limiting their use almost exclusively to public entities in 
limited circumstances. With the FAA Modernization Act and the 
projected expansion of their use,205 however, drones will likely surpass 
 
 203. This scenario is similar to—but distinguishable from—United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 
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fences and gates, and then looked into Dunn’s barn from an open field next to it, identifying a 
laboratory for illicit drugs. Id. at 296–99. In the above scenario, if the government were to stand 
in an open field on the property without a warrant and look through the window, the 
government’s actions would constitute a trespass—but not a search—under Dunn and the open-
fields doctrine. This scenario, however, presumes that the government does not trespass onto 
the property and conducts its surveillance from an area where it may lawfully do so. 
 204. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 205. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. 
11, 73 (2012). 
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the prevalence of helicopters in both the private and public sectors. 
And many of the technologies employed by drones, such as cameras 
and audio recorders, are already commonplace. Therefore, drones 
will likely soon be within general public use under Kyllo, and many 
forms of drone technology would already satisfy the general-use 
standard. 
C. Privacy-Rights Analysis of Drones 
With its holding in Katz, the Supreme Court adopted a privacy-
rights framework for determining whether a search had occurred for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. In Katz, Justice Harlan interpreted the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as recognizing two key 
elements for identifying a search.206 Under this inquiry, a search 
generally occurs when persons “have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy” and when that expectation is “one that society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”207 
The Court in Jones alluded to the possible Fourth Amendment 
inquiries that might be implicated in a case involving drone 
technology. In Jones, the Supreme Court suggested that warrantless, 
nontrespassory surveillance accomplished by traditional means 
typically would not qualify as an unreasonable search under current 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.208 The Court conceded, however, 
that the same surveillance conducted “through electronic means” 
might constitute “an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.”209 It 
recognized that courts might have to confront these problems in a 
“future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved,” but 
declined to address that scenario.210 
Although the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test presents the 
most viable Fourth Amendment doctrine to analyze drones, it has 
been highly criticized since its inception. The test has been said to 
“disappoint[] scholars and frustrate[] students for . . . decades.”211 It 
has frequently been “criti[cized] as circular, . . . subjective and 
 
 206. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 207. Id. 
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unpredictable.”212 Many legal texts forgo explaining the test, instead 
simply listing the relevant cases and outcomes.213 With numerous 
contrary holdings and no clear framework to analyze cases, a 
reasonable expectation of privacy “has largely come to mean what a 
majority of the Supreme Court Justices” says it means.214 Courts 
might, and evidence suggests they do, misidentify what society 
recognizes as a reasonable expectation of privacy.215 It has also been 
criticized as a standard that erodes over time216 because the 
development of technology slowly erodes the public’s privacy 
expectations and with it, the reasonable expectation of privacy.217 
The test’s current interpretation and application do not cover 
many of the different types of surveillance conducted by drones. 
There are two key problems with applying the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test to drone surveillance. First, there might 
not be a practical or reasonable way for persons unaware of their 
exposure to drones to satisfy the subjective requirement of the test. 
Second, as described above, the objectively reasonable requirement is 
highly unpredictable and has resulted in an unclear and unworkable 
standard. 
1. The Subjective-Expectation-of-Privacy Requirement.  A 
significant problem with applying the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test to drones is the subjective requirement of “exhibit[ing] an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.”218 When the Supreme 
Court has addressed the subjective requirement, albeit infrequently, it 
has looked to the presence of various expressive factors. In his 
concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan stated that the “objects, activities, 
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or statements that [a person] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders” 
fail the subjective requirement because the person exhibits no 
intention of keeping these items private.219 Dow discussed the 
subjective requirement at length,220 even though the case was decided 
primarily under the curtilage and open-fields doctrines.221 Although 
the Court disagreed on the probative value of the precautions taken 
by Dow to protect the privacy of its property, both the majority and 
the dissent mentioned several measures that might indicate a party’s 
subjective expectation of privacy, including a perimeter fence, 
security personnel, and other precautions against intrusion.222 The 
Court in Ciraolo also considered a fence around Ciraolo’s property as 
relevant to the subjective inquiry but concluded that the fence did not 
establish whether he manifested a subjective expectation of privacy 
from all types of observation.223 
Now consider drones with the capability to conduct surveillance 
of entire cities, to collect aggregated data on persons that, when taken 
together, may reveal intimate details, or to collect information 
believed to be free from unwelcome eyes, ears, and other sensory 
methods of detection.224 Each of these methods of surveillance can 
reveal entirely new types of information, information that is 
otherwise unattainable without detection, or information that is 
otherwise prohibitively expensive or difficult to acquire when 
obtained by traditional surveillance methods. Each makes it 
impossible or implausible to “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) 
expectation” and intention to keep these details private.225 And even 
when it is possible and reasonable to exhibit an expectation of privacy 
in these scenarios, the Court has failed to expound on what specific 
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Dow to protect the privacy of its property). 
 221. See id. at 239 (finding that the industrial complex was more similar to an open field 
than the curtilage). 
 222. See id. at 237 n.4 (discussing precautions taken to protect the privacy of a 
constitutionally protected area); id. at 241–42 (Powell, J., dissenting) (same). 
 223. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–12 (1986). 
 224. See, e.g., Finn, supra note 152 (discussing the planned deployment of drones to monitor 
a small town in Afghanistan); Lloyd, supra note 175 (discussing ARGUS technology, which can 
monitor and videotape fifteen square miles and track all moving objects within that area). 
 225. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
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actions or measures are necessary or sufficient to express a subjective 
expectation of privacy besides basic precautions, such as perimeter 
fences and closed phone booths. 
There are significant difficulties associated with exhibiting an 
actual subjective expectation of privacy from several types of drone 
surveillance. Drones can utilize numerous surveillance methods and 
can obtain countless types of information. Many people do not expect 
certain information or details to be at risk of being exposed to others. 
Consequently, many people will not take typical—or any—
precautions to protect the privacy of that information. Although 
hardly anyone expects the government to monitor them and uncover 
their personal information, this subjective expectation of privacy goes 
beyond that bare belief that one is not under investigation and 
extends to the expectation of privacy that people manifest by taking 
ordinary precautions to protect information from exposure to third 
parties. This idea extends both to information that people do not 
expect to be exposed to others by any method as well as to 
information that people do not expect to be exposed because of the 
precautions they have taken. 
Consider, for example, a drone with ARGUS technology, 
constantly monitoring the location of an individual for a month or 
longer.226 Or imagine the insect-like RoboBee conducting dragnet 
monitoring of a city block and using sniffers to test the air around 
individuals for specific biochemical agents undetectable by human 
senses.227 Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the 
subjective requirement does not inhibit the government from 
conducting such investigations. A person moving in public “has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”228 Furthermore, a party claiming a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights by these governmental actions would fail the 
subjective requirement because he has not exhibited his expectation 
of privacy with respect to this information. Based on the Court’s 
precedent of considering the specific privacy precautions taken, an 
affected individual would likely fail to take a sufficient precaution, 
 
 226. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 175 (describing ARGUS technology and its surveillance 
capabilities). 
 227. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 166 (describing the RoboBee); MAKEL ENG’G, INC., supra 
note 183 (describing a drone that sniffs the air for chemical, biological, and narcotic agents). 
 228. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
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such as concealing his public movements or wearing specific garments 
to conceal any smells or agents.229 
Additional problems arise when these measures are impossible 
or implausible. In Dow, the vast property and safety concerns 
prevented Dow from installing an overhead canopy.230 Had the Court 
found the area to constitute the curtilage and not an open field,231 the 
lack of a canopy—or a comparable precaution—would have likely 
negated Dow’s expression of a subjective expectation of privacy for 
the curtilage.232 It therefore seems that only a dome or structure 
covering the entire two-thousand-acre property would have been 
sufficient for the Court to find that Dow exhibited a subjective 
expectation of privacy in activities occurring within the curtilage of 
the property. 
2. The Objective-Expectation-of-Privacy Requirement.  There are 
also significant problems with the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
test’s objective requirement that “the [subjective] expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”233 Determining 
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable turns on “whether 
the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal 
values protected by the Fourth Amendment.”234 
Analyzing whether an expectation of privacy from drone 
surveillance is objectively reasonable, however, seems to be an 
informed guess, at best. The Supreme Court has neglected to adopt a 
single test or approach to determine whether an expectation of 
privacy is reasonable.235 The Court has considered many factors in 
applying the test and has returned a series of “divergent and 
conflicting” opinions and holdings.236 This approach has allowed the 
 
 229. These scenarios are more likely to turn on the facts of the case, specifically those 
indicating the extent of the precautions taken and the risk of exposure of the information. 
 230. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 n.1 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(“The record establishes that Dow used the open-air design primarily for reasons of safety . . . . 
Moreover, . . . Dow found that the cost of enclosing the facility would be prohibitive.”). 
 231. See id. at 239 (holding that the area was more analogous to an open field than to the 
curtilage). 
 232. See id. at 236 (“The intimate activities associated with family privacy and the home and 
its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and buildings of 
a manufacturing plant.”). 
 233. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 234. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182–83 (1984). 
 235. Kerr, supra note 211, at 525. 
 236. Wilkins, supra note 14, at 1080. 
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lower federal courts to justify almost any result.237 Consequently, an 
analysis of the reasonableness of drones will depend on their specific 
use and various intangible factors. Thus, in nearly all Fourth 
Amendment cases considering governmental surveillance by drones, 
the objective reasonableness of a subjective expectation of privacy 
seems up for grabs. 
IV.  REDEFINING THE REASONABLE-EXPECTATION-OF-
PRIVACY TEST 
The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test provides the most 
viable approach for future cases considering whether the 
government’s use of a drone constitutes an unreasonable search. In 
applying this test, courts should focus more analysis on the subjective-
expectation requirement and expand upon its existing interpretation 
because this oft-neglected element of the two-pronged test238 is 
especially relevant to drones. 
In further addressing and clarifying the subjective requirement, 
the analysis should proceed in three parts. First, a court should 
determine whether the surveilled person “exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy”239 so as to fall within the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections. Second, if the person has exhibited a 
subjective expectation of privacy, the court should then analyze the 
scope of that privacy expectation and the information it covers. 
Finally, the court should determine whether the person has exposed 
that information to the “‘plain view’ of outsiders.”240 
A. The Reasonable-Expectation-of-Privacy Test 
Adopting a versatile standard focused on the subjective-
expectation-of-privacy test may provide the most effective approach 
to reviewing drone surveillance. This flexible approach accounts for 
both the diverse factual dynamics of Fourth Amendment cases and 
 
 237. See Kerr, supra note 211, at 525–26 (noting that categorization choices under a policy 
model can be “completely arbitrary”). 
 238. See Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 
81 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448617. (“A majority of courts that apply 
Katz do not even mention the subjective test; when the test is mentioned, it is usually not 
applied; and when it is applied, it makes no apparent difference to case outcomes.”). 
 239. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 240. Id. 
KOERNER IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2015  11:35 PM 
1164 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1129 
the nebulous nature of nontrespassory Fourth Amendment issues.241 It 
also provides a workable standard for drones and technology in the 
modern age when the need for Fourth Amendment and privacy 
protections extends beyond the home and the other traditionally 
protected areas.242 
A significant problem with the current interpretation of the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test is the manner in which the 
courts have applied the test. Courts have more “flex[ed] than 
analy[zed]” the test.243 Moreover, courts have focused almost 
exclusively on the objective requirement and neglected nearly any 
analysis of the subjective-expectation requirement.244 Even when the 
Supreme Court has addressed the subjective-expectation 
requirement, it has often failed to clarify what measures are necessary 
or sufficient to express a subjective expectation of privacy.245 
Realigning the scope of analysis from the objective requirement 
to the subjective requirement would solve many of the problems with 
applying the current interpretation of the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test to drones. Instead of attempting to analyze and ascertain 
what expectations of privacy society as a whole would recognize as 
reasonable, the subjective requirement looks to the specific factual 
circumstances in determining whether an expectation exists. This 
realignment would provide a clearer, more consistent analysis for trial 
courts than the nebulous determinations of the objective 
requirement. 
 
 241. See Kerr, supra note 211 (arguing against a single test or approach for determining the 
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy because no single test or approach could properly 
apply to the numerous issues presented by Fourth Amendment cases); supra Part I.A. 
(discussing the factual dynamics of Fourth Amendment cases). But see Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 181–82 (1984) (“Th[e Supreme] Court repeatedly has acknowledged the 
difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth 
Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances. The ad hoc approach not 
only makes it difficult for the policeman to discern the scope of his authority, it also creates a 
danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 242. Wilkins, supra note 14, at 1079. 
 243. Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
 244. Kerr, supra note 238 (manuscript at 2) (“A majority of courts that apply Katz do not 
even mention the subjective test; when the test is mentioned, it is usually not applied; and when 
it is applied, it makes no apparent difference to case outcomes.”). 
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 222–23. 
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B. The Subjective-Expectation-of-Privacy Requirement 
1. Determining Whether a Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
Exists. In determining whether a person holds a subjective 
expectation of privacy in certain information, various factors might 
indicate her intention to keep information private. The Supreme 
Court has detailed some of these factors,246 but further attention and 
clarification is needed. Moreover, these expressive factors are not 
always needed to support a subjective expectation. Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence should come to recognize that in certain 
situations, the lack of evidence exhibiting an expectation of privacy 
results from the person’s belief that the information is at little or no 
risk of being revealed to others. The lack of expressive factors, 
therefore, may evidence a robust subjective expectation of privacy 
that is still entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 
A person can express a subjective expectation of privacy through 
different expressive factors. These factors “exhibit [an] . . . intention 
to keep” certain information private.247 The location of the private 
information is not determinative or necessary to negate this 
expectation of privacy. Katz described this relationship as follows: 
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”248 
Although expressive factors provide concrete evidence to 
ascertain whether a subjective expectation of privacy exists, they may 
be lacking in cases where the person believes there is little or no risk 
of having her information revealed to others. In these cases, in which 
the expectation of privacy is arguably strongest, few people would 
take measures that would objectively evidence an expectation of 
privacy. Courts should consider the probability of public exposure 
and the practicality or reasonableness of taking different information-
protecting precautions when determining whether a subjective 
expectation of privacy exists, even absent previously recognized 
expressive factors. 
For example, consider a RoboBee flying outside the curtilage 
and immediate reaches of a property and recording a conversation 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 248. Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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occurring within the curtilage—audible from the public airways 
overhead but not from the perimeter of the property. Here, most 
people would not expect the conversation to be exposed to listeners 
from above. A reasonable individual would believe that a sufficient 
distance from the perimeter of the property, a normal speaking 
volume, and an absence of any parties unwelcome to the conversation 
would be sufficient to indicate that the conversation was intended to 
be private. The speaker’s estimate of a marginal or zero probability of 
this information being exposed to others demonstrates a subjective 
expectation of privacy with respect to the information. The lack of 
expressive factors alone does not fail to create a subjective 
expectation. Instead, the expectation may be exhibited through 
expressive actions or measures. A subjective expectation of privacy 
must already exist before it may be exhibited. Expressive factors do 
not create a subjective expectation; they exhibit it. 
Under other circumstances, the impossibility or 
unreasonableness of taking certain measures to exhibit a subjective 
expectation of privacy in information also may justify the failure to 
exhibit any such factors. For example, consider again the hypothetical 
of a RoboBee using sniffers to test the air around individuals for 
biological and chemical agents emanating from their persons or 
effects. If it were known that these investigations actually occurred, 
people would have little or no opportunity to protect this information 
and exhibit an expectation of privacy in it. Furthermore, even if some 
precautions could be taken (for example, wearing a full-body hazmat 
suit), these precautions would be unreasonable and would impose 
costly and impractical burdens preventing many individuals from 
taking such measures. Consequently, people would be subject to 
these investigations without a feasible way to exhibit their subjective 
expectation to keep this information private. Imagine if the 
SolarEagle were used to monitor individuals’ locations over an 
extensive span of time.249 If a person expects to keep his long-term 
record of visits to his attorney or psychotherapist private, he would 
not take burdensome precautions to conceal this information—
analogous to a fence around a yard or a closed door of a phone 
booth—such as repetitively altering the route traveled, the office 
visited, or his physical and vocal attributes at such meetings. 
 
 249. See, e.g., Roper, supra note 179 (reporting on a “license-plate reader” that digitally 
recognized and recorded the exact location of the Minneapolis mayor’s vehicle at least forty-one 
times over the course of a year). 
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These two examples illustrate that the lack of measures 
exhibiting an expectation of privacy does not negate a subjective 
expectation of privacy in all circumstances. If it is found that no 
measures were exhibited, courts determining whether the subjective-
expectation requirement was satisfied should first consider the 
assumed probability of exposure of the information. In addition, they 
should consider the plausibility and reasonableness of exhibiting a 
subjective expectation of privacy in that information. Surveilled 
individuals might still satisfy the subjective requirement by showing 
either that there was an assumed marginal risk that the information 
would be exposed or that the only measures available to exhibit a 
subjective expectation of privacy would have been implausible or 
impracticable. If a court holds that the person did maintain a 
subjective expectation of privacy despite the lack of expressive 
factors, then the scope of that expectation, whether he exposed the 
information to the plain view of others, and the objective 
reasonableness of that expectation would still be relevant in 
determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists to 
establish a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
2. Determining the Scope of the Subjective Expectation of Privacy.  
The scope of a person’s subjective expectation of privacy is also 
relevant in determining whether a Fourth Amendment search 
occurred. Under this inquiry, the scope of the expectation is critical to 
understanding the extent of the information protected from 
governmental intrusions. If an expectation of privacy to remain free 
from intrusion by certain categories of sensory detection extends to 
only some, but not other, types of information, then any information 
falling outside of that scope would not be protected. Therefore, the 
government’s acquisition of this unsheltered information would not 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Consider the Katz decision itself, in which the Court held that 
the government’s recording of Katz’s telephone conversations in an 
enclosed telephone booth constituted an unreasonable search.250 By 
closing the door to the phone booth, Katz exhibited an expectation of 
privacy for the oral content of his phone conversation.251 The closed 
door, assuming it was transparent, would not exhibit Katz’s 
expectation of privacy from visual observations, including his 
 
 250. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.  
 251. Id. at 352. 
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presence in the phone booth, his use of the telephone, and, possibly, 
the telephone number he dialed or the contents of the conversation if 
they were recorded by a lip reader observing the phone booth.252 
Therefore, the scope of Katz’s subjective expectation of privacy 
extended to his oral conversation, but not to these physical 
characteristics. 
3. Determining Whether a Person Exposed Information to the 
Plain View of Outsiders.  Justice Harlan expanded on his reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test by clarifying that information “expose[d] 
to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders [is] not ‘protected’” because no 
intention to keep it private “has been exhibited.”253 When a person 
exposes something to the plain view of the public, he also willingly 
discloses certain information along with it.254 A voluntary disclosure, 
however, does not forfeit all related expectations of privacy—or the 
minimum protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 
Bond v. United States255 provides a key example of the scope of 
an exposure of information to others, although the case was decided 
using the objective-expectation-of-privacy requirement.256 In Bond, a 
CBP officer checked bus passengers’ identifications and squeezed 
luggage bags in the bus’s overhead bins to check for illicit drugs.257 
The officer squeezed Steven Bond’s bag and identified a “‘brick-like’ 
object,” which was found to be a package of methamphetamine.258 
The Supreme Court held that Bond had exhibited a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the contents of his luggage bag by storing his 
items within the bag and placing the bag in the overhead bin directly 
above him.259 By placing the bag in the public bin, Bond exposed the 
bag to typical visual observation and casual physical contact by others 
 
 252. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 38, at 88; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (“But what he 
sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited 
ear.”). 
 253. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 254. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I 
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a 
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 255. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).  
 256. See id. at 338–39 (analyzing whether society would recognize Bond’s subjective 
expectation as reasonable and holding that the government’s conduct violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights). 
 257. Id. at 335. 
 258. Id. at 336.  
 259. Id. at 339.  
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intending to move the bag.260 The extent of this public exposure, 
however, did not invite or permit handling of the bag in a purposeful, 
“exploratory manner.”261 
As Bond illustrates, the concept of information “expose[d] to the 
‘plain view’ of outsiders,” articulated in Justice Harlan’s Katz 
concurrence, relates to the level and extent of the exposure.262 Just as 
Bond exposed his bag to only a certain level of observation and 
handling, a public exposure does not forfeit all expectations of 
privacy in the protected person or effects. Furthermore, the level of 
the exposure of information that is readily detectable by others is 
limited because the information must be exposed to the plain view of 
the public. People do not expose information to the plain view of the 
public when acquiring that information would require invasive, sense-
enhancing technology or long-term monitoring—surveillance that 
reveals more information than a plain-view observer is able to 
uncover. 
For example, consider again a RoboBee equipped with a sniffer 
to test the air for chemical and biological agents. A person probably 
knows that any strong or detectable odors emanating from his body 
or effects are susceptible to being smelled by others. The person 
probably would not believe, however, that scents or agents 
undetectable by the natural olfactory senses would be at risk of 
exposure by advanced technology. Not only does he not knowingly or 
willingly intend to expose this information, but this information is 
also unavailable to the plain view and the natural senses of the public. 
The government is able to elicit this information only by inspecting 
the individual in a purposeful “exploratory manner,” similar to the 
CBP officer squeezing the bag in Bond. 
Another helpful illustration is the above-mentioned example of 
an ARGUS-equipped SolarEagle, which monitors an individual for 
an extended period of time. When the person steps into the public 
view, he willingly exposes his person and effects to observation by 
others. The SolarEagle, however, may uncover far more information 
by compiling an extensive amount of data on the observed person’s 
public activities. By aggregating this information, the SolarEagle 
could produce a detailed log of every location the person has visited, 
along with the dates, times, and durations of those visits. This 
 
 260. Id. at 338. 
 261. Id. at 338–39. 
 262. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
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surveillance reveals more detailed information than what is available 
to the plain view of the ordinary public observer. 
Some might argue that by engaging in any activity, behavior, or 
expression that is exposed to the public, an individual forfeits all 
associated expectations of privacy.263 These opinions fail to recognize 
that our private lives are not derived solely from the comings and 
goings that transpire exclusively within the sanctity of the home. Our 
private lives consist of numerous activities, behaviors, and expressions 
occurring at home, in public, at work,264 and in society as a whole—
both in solitude and in the presence of others. Secrecy does not 
equate to privacy and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence must come 
to reflect this distinction.265 Although expectations of privacy may be 
nebulous, individuals still expect certain information to remain 
private and free from government intrusion. This is the very heart of 
the Fourth Amendment. And as long established by the Supreme 
Court, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”266 
The extent and level of exposure of information to the plain view 
of the public is especially relevant to drone technology. Just as a 
“careful [tactile] exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s 
clothing all over his or her body” violates the sanctity of his body and 
the level and extent of information he exposes to the public,267 
invasive explorations and investigations of a person or her effects by 
drones may also violate this sanctity and the extent of the information 
she has exposed. Thus, by driving an automobile down a public road, 
 
 263. Cf. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 (1984) (“[W]e reject the suggestion that 
steps taken to protect privacy establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are 
legitimate.”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting) (applying a textualist interpretation to 
a Fourth Amendment issue and concluding that “[a] conversation overheard by eavesdropping, 
whether by plain snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted 
meaning of the words, can neither be searched nor seized”). 
 264. In the workplace context, the Supreme Court has “recognized that employees may 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police” and “[g]iven the societal 
expectations of privacy in one’s place of work[,] . . . [has] rejected the contention . . . that public 
employees can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work.” 
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716–17 (1987). This expectation of privacy, however, “must 
be assessed in the context of the employment relation.” Id. at 717.  
 265. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“But 
whatever the societal expectations [for privacy], [persons] can attain constitutionally protected 
status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite to 
privacy.”); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 (“The test of [Fourth Amendment] legitimacy is not whether 
the individual chooses to conceal assertedly ‘private’ activity.” (emphasis added)). 
 266. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 267. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968)). 
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a person exposes the exterior portions of the car to the public, and a 
law-enforcement officer’s observation of the car does not constitute a 
search.268 However, many people—including, perhaps, members of the 
Supreme Court—would find it deeply disturbing for the government 
to monitor their every move in public.269 Drones render such 
monitoring possible. Public movements, however, should not be 
deemed to expose to the public’s plain view an intricate, detailed map 
of the exact dates, times, and locations of an individual over an 
extensive period of time. Similarly, individuals should not be deemed 
to expose the biological and chemical agents emanating from their 
persons and effects, which may be detected by the hovering 
RoboBee, to the plain view of the public. 
CONCLUSION 
When issues concerning the use of drones by the government 
arise, courts should apply the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test 
and expand on the subjective-expectation-of-privacy requirement. In 
applying the test, they should determine whether there is a subjective 
expectation of privacy, whether the scope of that privacy expectation 
extended to the acquired information, and then whether the person 
exposed the information to the plain view of the public. Analysis of 
the subjective requirement, however, should not be overlooked as 
courts have commonly done. Courts should also recognize that an 
absence of expressive factors exhibiting a subjective expectation of 
privacy does not defeat a subjective requirement. Expressive factors 
merely evidence the existence of a subjective expectation; they do not 
create it. When expressive factors are absent, an individual can still 
demonstrate that a subjective expectation existed. Finally, courts 
should also recognize that a subjective expectation of privacy extends 
to a defined scope of information and that an exposure of this 
information forfeits the Fourth Amendment protections attached 
only to the information that is exposed to the plain view of the public. 
The analysis outlined in this Note provides guidance for 
resolving many of the current difficulties in applying Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to drones. These difficulties are especially 
troubling given the numerous practical benefits that drones could 
 
 268. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986). 
 269. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–16, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259) (asking 
whether the government may, without a warrant, monitor the Supreme Court Justices’ public 
movements for a month). 
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provide to law enforcement and others. The advancement and 
successes of drone technology, however, will likely be achieved only if 
there is a proper balance between the government’s investigative 
powers and an individual’s constitutional rights, as the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to achieve. Future cases considering the 
government’s use of drones for surveillance should recognize the 
critical analysis provided by the subjective requirement. Perhaps only 
then will Fourth Amendment jurisprudence find an appropriate 
balance between governmental surveillance by drones and the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections from governmental intrusion. 
